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436 PEOPLE V. MODESTO [62C.2d 
[Crim. No. 7877. In Bank. Feb. 11, 1965.] 
THE PEOPLE. Plaintiff and Respondent, V. LAWRENCE 
GLENN MODESTO, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Oriminal Law-Venue-Ohange of Venue-Prejudice of Oom-
munity.-The trial court on retrial of a first degree murder 
ease eould reasonably conclude that defendant could secure 
a fair trial in the county of trial notwithstanding extensive 
newspaper coverage of his first trial, and the court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a 
(lhange of venue without prejudice before trial or err in fail-
ing thereafter to raise the question on its own motion, where 
the ease was retried before a different trial judge, no difficulty 
was experienced in securing jurors who were not aware of 
the earlier publicity, and defendant did not exhaust his per-
emptory challenges or renew his motion to change venue. 
[2] Homicide-Evidence-Photographs.-In a prosecution for 
the murder of two young girls, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that the probative value of photo-
graphs and color slides of the victims, which it admitted in 
evidence, outweighed any probable prejudicial effect. 
[3] Oriminal Law-Separate Proceeding on Issue of Insanity.-
On the sanity trial of a murder prosecution arising out of 
the killing of two young girls, verdicts finding defendant 
sane could not be disturbed in view ofa conflict in the testi-
mony of psychiatrists as to whether he was sane or insane 
at the time he committed the homicides. 
[4] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a prosecution 
for the murder of two young girls, defendant's last and most 
damaging statements to the police describing the details of 
the commission of the crime against one of the girls, includ-
ing the fact that he thought he had had intercourse with her, 
were not admissible where they were made. during an in-
vestigation focused on defendant who was then in custody 
[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 226-230j Am.Jur., Evidence (1st 
cd § 451). 
[4] l'ee Oal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §146j Evidence, §422' Am. 
Jur., Criminal Law (1st ed § 167 ct seq). ' 
McK. Dig. References; [1] Criminal Law, § 88; [2] Homicide, 
§1l8; [3] Criminal Law, §235(4); [4-6] Criminal Law, §464; 
[7, 18] Criminal Law, §§ 628(1a), 852.1; Witnesses, § 19; [8] 
Criminal Law, §628(1); Witnesses, §19; [9] Witnesses, §14; 
[10-15] Criminal Law, §§ 628(la), 852.1; [16,17] Witnesses, § 19; 
[19] Criminal Law, § 1011.1. 
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and said repeatedly that he wished to tell his attorney first, 
where the authorities did not effectively inform him of 
his right to counselor absolute right to remain silent, where 
no evidence established his waiver of these rights, and where 
the authorities' process of interrogation lent itself to eliciting 
incriminating statements. It was immaterial that defendant 
was allowed to consult with his attorney several hours earlier 
and was advised that he could talk to the police if he wished 
and repeat the substantially less damaging admissions he had 
already made, there being no evidence that he was advised 
as to what he should or could do in the face of the continuing 
interrogation that took place. 
[5] Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-In a prosecution 
for the murder of two young girls, statements made by de-
fendant to the police before the body of one of the girls 
was discovered were admissible, where they were freely and 
voluntarily made at a time when the officers were concerned 
primarily with the possibility of saving the girl's life; this 
paramount interest justified the officers in not impeding their 
rescue e1Iorts by informing defendant of his rights to remain 
silent and to the assistance of counsel. 
[6J Id.-Evidence-Oonfessions-Admissibility.-!n a prosecution 
for the murder of two young girls, statements made by defend-
ant between the time one girl's body was found and the time 
he sought to consult again with his attorney were inadmissible 
unless, as to such statements, he waived his right to counsel 
and his right to remain silent. 
[7&,7bJ Id.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify: Wit-
nesses-Self-incrimination.-Const., art. I, § 13, permitting both 
the trial court and the prosecutor to comment on defendant's 
failure to take the stand in a criminal case, does not infringe 
his privilege against self-incrimination. 
[8] Id.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to Testify: Witnesses 
-Self-incrimina.tion.-The rule against comment in the federal 
courts by the trial court and the prosecutor on defendant's 
failure to take the stand does not necessitate holding the state 
comment rule unconstitutional, since the federal rule is founded 
not on constitutional command but on statutory interpretation .. 
[9J Witnesses-Self-incrimination.-Although it is the federal 
privilege against self-incrimination that is protected by U.S., 
[7] Constitutional or statutory provision permitting comment on 
failure of accus'ed to testify in his own behalf as violation of con-
stitutional privilege against self-crimination note, 104 A.L.B.. 478. 
Comment by court suggesting that,jury may take into consideration 
failure of accused person to testify, note, 94 A.L.B.. 701. See also 
Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, §§ 115,116; Witnesses, § 19. 
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Const., 14th Amend., the state must follow only the constitu-
tional and not the statutory aspects of the privilege. 
[10] Criminal Law-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify. 
-Const., art. I, § 13, permitting the trial court and the prose-
cutor to comment on defendant's failure to take the stand in 
a criminal case, does not relieve the prosecution of its burden 
of proving every essential element of the crime and defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. No presumption of guilt or 
of the truth of any fact arises, and no inference can be drawn 
if defendant does not have the knowledge necessary to explain 
or deny the evidence against him. 
[11] ld.-Comment on Failure of Defenda.nt to'l'estify.-Comment 
by the trial court and the prosecutor on defendant's failure to 
take the stand, as permitted by Const., art. I, § 13, serves mere-
ly to advise the jury how to treat the evidence that the prose-
cution has introduced. If it appears from the evidence that 
defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny 
evidence presented against him, the jury may consider his 
failure to do so as tending to indicate the truth of such evi-
dence and as indicating that among the inferences that may 
reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to defend-
ant are the more probable. 
[12] ld.-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-The Cali-
fornia comment rule does not subject defendant to the tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt, since he remains 
free not to testify. It does not substitute an inquisitorial 
system for an accusatorial system, affords no opportunity for 
eliciting statements by inhumane treatment or abuses, does 
not permit the government to disturb the individual without 
good cause or deprecate the inviolability of the human per-
sonality, does not compel reliance on self-deprecatory state-
ments, and thus does not significantly impair any protection 
the privilege against self-incrimination affords the innocent. 
[18] ld.-Comment on Failure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-Where 
defendant in a criminal case is normally faced with the choice 
of testifying to avoid adverse inferences or of remaining silent 
and suffering their cousequences, comments by the trial court 
or the prosecutor on defendant's failure to testify do not 
magnify these normal negative consequences to the extent that 
they become a "penalty" prohibited by U.S. Const., 14th 
Amend. 
[14] ld.-Comment on Fa.ilure of Defendant to 'l'estify.-Although 
comments by the trial court or the prosecutor on defendant's 
failure to testify might encourage some defendants to testify 
to avoid the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from 
their failure to do so, this encouragement does not amount to 
the oompulsion to testify condemned by U. S. Coust., 5th 
) 
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Amend.; the comments merely guide the jury in doing what it 
would nonnally do in any casco 
[15] Id.-oomment on Failure of Defendant to Testify.-The state 
Supreme Court is bound by the California Constitution's pro-
vision for comment by the trial court or the prosecutor on 
defendant's failure to testify, unless such ,provision clearly 
violates the United States Constitution. 
[16] Witnesses-Duty to Testify-Effect of Failure to Testify.-
Though a defendant may refuse to testify because of fear that 
" his prior convictions will be introduced to impeach him and 
will prejudice the jury, the inference that the jury is 
authorized to ,draw from his failure to take the stand 
need not be the only plausible one ,to be rational. under 
the due process clause. Even without tbcrule permitting 
comment by the trial court or the prosecutor, defendant still 
faces the dilemma of choosing to testify and having his prior 
convictions introduced or of remaining silent and not giving 
his evidence to the jury. ' , . 
I17] Id • ....;;.self-incrimination-Defendants in Oriminal Oases.-The 
privilege against self-incrimination protects defendant from as-
sisting the prosecution in building its case against him. It 
cannot protect him from the inferences that may reasonably 
be drawn from his failure to' rebut the prosecution's ease to 
the best of his apparent ability. 
[18] Oriminal Law-Oomment on Failure of Defendant to Testify: 
Witnesses-8elf-incrimina.tion.-Existence of the privilege 
against self-incrimination is a matter of common knowledge, 
and whatever use defendant makes of it at his trial is also a 
fact known to the jury. The objective of the court's instructions 
and counsel's arguments in commenting on defendant's failure 
to testify is to assist the jury in reaching the correct decision 
on the basis of all of tbe evidence before it; U. S. Const., 5th 
Amend., condemning the compUlsion to testify, imposes no 
pointless taboo on the pursuit of that objective. 
[19] Id.-Punishment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-On 
the penalty phase of a capital case, no error could be based 
on admitting into evidence inflammatory details of other crimes 
committed by defendant where the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that the probatiVe value of the 
challenged evidence outweighed any probable prejudicial e1lect. 
APPEAL, ,"utomatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside 
County. John G. Gabbert, Jud,e. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty, reversed. 
440 PEOPLE V. MODESTO [62 C.2d 
Richard Gladstein, under appointment by the Supreme 
Court, and Norman Leonard for Defendant and Appellant. 
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General, 
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, Norman H. 
Sokolow, Deputy Attorney General, William O. Mackey, Dis-
trict Attorney (Riverside), and Roland Wilson, Deputy Dis-
trict Attorney, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-This appeal is automatic from a judg-
ment imposing the death penalty. (Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b).) . 
In a previous trial defendant had been found .guilty of the 
first degree murders of Connie Mack and Mary Mack, and 
sentenced to death. The judgment was reversed on the ground 
that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury 
on the issue of manslaughter. (PeopZe v. Modesto, 59 Ca1.2d 
'722,727-731 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) Before retrial 
defendant reinstated his pleas of not guilty by reason of 
insanity, which he had withdrawn during the first trial. Upon 
retrial the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of 
first degree murder, determined that he was sane at the time 
each crime was committed, and fixed the penalty on each 
count at death. 
At the retrial on the issue of guilt the prosecution intro-
duced substantially the same evidence it introduced at the 
former trial. The basic facts were summarized in our former 
opinion as follows . 
•• Shortly after midnight on October 29, 1961, defendant 
entered the home of Mr. and Mrs. Ardel Mack carrying a 
hand sledge hammer with a 4-pound head. The Macks' daugh-
ters, Connie, age 12, and Mary, age 9, were asleep in the 
house. At about 10 :30 p.m. the previous evening defendant 
had seen Mr. and Mrs. Mack at a place where Mr. Mack played 
the guitar with a band and knew that they would not return 
home until about 2 a.m. Upon returning home the Macks 
found Mary lying on the :8.oor dead. Connie had disappeared. 
Her blankets were on the :8.oor. and there was blood on her bed. 
"Defendant was arrested at his home at about 2 :30 a.m., 
October 29, 1961. The arresting officers found bloodstains 
on the right rear fendfr, the right rear door handle, the rear 
seat, and the :8.oor mat of defendant'8 automobile. The blood 
on the rear seat appeared to have been smeared by a body 
~oving on the seat. Defendant's sledge hammer was removed 
) 
) 
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from the trunk of his automobile. A chemist testified that 
the hammer had been heavily smeared with blood and had 
been washed. 
"At the time of his arrest, defendant was asleep in his 
bed, wearing only a pair of shorts. His hands were blood-
stained, as were his shorts and his other clothes found on the 
floor of his room. A police chemist testified that there were 
semen stains on defendant's T-shirt, on the outside of his 
trousers, and on the shorts he was wearing when arrested . 
•• At 7 p.m. on the day of his arrest, defendant admitted 
to police investigators that he struck Mary and Connie with 
the sledge hammer. He stated that he entered the Mack homc 
'with the intentions of scaring Connie Jean for the way she 
has been acting, snotty and smart-aleckie, and just to kind of 
get back at her for a lot of things she said. I went into the 
house through the side door. The house was dark and the 
door wasn't locked. So I went to the bedroom, flicked on the 
light and Connie Jean turned over and mumbled something 
and I shut the light off again, and I went over to shake her 
awake, and little Mary turned on the light, and I turned 
around with the intention of scaring her, and my hand went 
too far and I hit her with the sledge hammer. She went down, 
moaning, and Connie Jean started screaming, so I told her 
to be quiet, and I went like this (indicating) to hit her too, 
but my hammer just went right on and I hit her too; and 
I don't know, after that I don't know how many times I hit 
them-three or four or five times apiece--I don't know. They 
were moaning and screaming and I couldn't remember how 
many times I hit them. • 
,. Defendant stated to the officers that he then picked up 
Connie and dropped her on the lawn, returning to the house 
for the hammer. After putting Connie's unconscious body 
on the rear floor of the car, defendant stated that he intended 
to go back for Mary, but panicked and drove away when he 
saw the lights of approaching automobiles. Shortly thereafter 
he stopped at a drainage ditch to clean the blood from Con-
nie's head. 'When I opened the door her legs hung out. And 
the next thing I knew she was on the ground-so I grabbed 
her by the hand and pulled her over to the side of that drain-
age ditch . . . ~ I could get some water to clean her off, and 
she just tumbled into the water, moaning loudly .... ' 
"Defendant also stated to tile officers that 'Between there 
[the drainage ditch] and ... the house ... I don't know 
) 
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where I stopped. I'm not sure in my mind, but I think-II 
think I had intercourse with Connie-I'm not sure.' 
"Connie's body was found face down in the drainage ditch 
downstream from the point at whieh defendant stated she 
had gone into the water. 
,. Autopsies of the girls' bodies showed four separate injurieS 
to Connie's head and 1ive separate injuries to Mary's head, 
which were probably in1licted by the sledge hammer. Although 
drowning was the immediate cause of Connie's death" the I 
injuries to her head would have been fatal. Mary's ,death 
resulted from injuries to the brain caused by multiple skull \' 
fractures. Since Connie had been carried downstream in 
rapidly moving water and had been in the water nine to ten 
hours, the pathologist was unable to state whether or not she 
had been sexually molested;" (People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 
722, 725-727 [31 Ca1.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) I 
It is not disputed that defendant killed the two girls. The I 
prosecution sought to prove that the killings were murders I 
of the 1irst degree on the ground that they were either wilful, 1 
deliberate, and premeditated, or occurred during the com- ' 
mission of burglary, rape, or an act punishable under Penal ! 
Code section 288. (Pen. Code, § 189.) Defendant did not \ 
testify. lie relied on evidence of intoxication and brain dam- , 
age to support the opinion of expert witnesses that he did not ' 
form a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill or an intent I 
to commit any of the enumerated felonies. Although he pre-
sented more extensive evidence of this defense at the retrial 
than at the former trial, we are not persuaded to depart from 
our holding on the former appeal that the evidence is suffi-
cient to support the verdicts. (59 Ca1.2d at p. 727.) , 
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a change of venue on the groUIfd that 
he could not obtain a fair and impartial trial in Riverside 
County. (Pen. Code, § 1033.) He supported his motion with 
affidavits setting forth the extensive newspaper coverage of 
his 1irst trial and this court's reversal of the judgment. He 
asserts that the prospective jurors must have been aware of 
his criminal record, including the fact that he was on parole 
from a judgment of conviction of second degree murder at 
the time 'of the present homicides; that he had confessed; 
and tha(the trial judge at the 1irst trial had stated his agree-
ment with the verdicts and later vigorously criticized the 
decision of this court reversing the judgment. 
The newspaper articles attached to defendant's affidavit 
) 
) 
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were published from October 31, 1961, to July 17, 1963. The 
case was retried before a different trial judge, who denied 
defendant's motion to change venue without prejudice on 
September 10, 1963. The trial was commenced on October 14, 
1963, and no difficulty was experienced in securing jurors who 
were not aware of the earlier publicity. Defendant did not 
eXhaust his peremptory challenges, and he did not renew his 
motion to change venue. Under these circumstances the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
motion without prejudice before trial and did not err in 
failing to raise the question on its own motion thereafter . 
.. It could reasonably conclude that defendant Could secure a 
. fair trial in Riverside County .. (See People v. Duncan, 53 
Cal.2d 803,812 [350 P.2d 103J ;cf. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 
717, 720, 726-727 [81 8. Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d751]; People v. 
McKay, 37 Ca1.2d 792, 800 [236 P.2d 145J.) 
[2] Defendant contends that· the trial court erred in 
admitting into evidence photographs and color slides of the 
victims. We adhere to our holding on the former appeal that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining . 
that the probative value of this evidence outweighed any 
probable prejudicial effect. (PeopZe v. Modesto, 69 Ca1.2d 
722, 733-734 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225·, 382P.2d 33].) 
[3] At the trial on the issue of sanity, defendant relied 
on the testimony of two psychiatrists that he was undergoing 
a psycho-motor epileptie seizure at the time he committed the 
homirides and was therefore legally insane. The proseeution 
relied on the testimony of four other psyehiatrists to the effect 
that defendant was legally sane. In view of this eorillict, there 
is no merit in defendant's contention that the evidenee does 
not support the verdiets finding him sane. 
['] At the trial on the issue of guilt several statements 
made by defendaI;lt to the police were introduced into evi-
dence over objection after the prosecution laid a foundation 
that each statement was freely and voluntarily made. De-
fendant contends that at least the last and most damaging 
of these statements was inadmissible under the decisions of 
the United States Supreme Court in Massiah v. United States, 
377 U.S. 201 l'84 S.Ct. 1199, 12L.Ed.2d 246], and Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [84 S.Ct. 1768, 12 L.Ed.2d 977]. 
We shall eonsider the admissibi)ity of all of them in the light 
of those decisions. 
Officer Mabbitt questioned defendant at about 6 in the 
morning following the homicides. At that time Connie's 
·'/,-) 
..... . " 
) 
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.body llad not been found. Defendant stated that he met 
Connie's father about 10 a.m. the day before and that he and 
Connie's father bought beer and drove around while drinking 
it. About 3 :30 in the afternoon they picked up Connie. and 
took her home. She refused to ride in the front seat between 
defendant and her father until her father told her to do so. 
After taking Connie home, the two men bought and drank 
more beer and then took someone from the Modesto residence 
to a christening. 
About 7 :30 a.m. Officer Mabbitt was joined by Mr. Boller, 
an investigator from the district attorney's office, and the 
two had a second conversation with defendant. He repeated 
to .Mr.Boller what he had told Officer Mabbitt and at tirst 
denied having seen Connie after he took her home the after-
noon before. . Either Officer Mabbitt or Mr. Boller suggested 
·to defendant that Connie might still be alive and that if he 
could help them to locate her, they might be able to save her 
. life. Defendant studied a few minu.tes and then said "water," 
studied a few more minutes and said, "Avenue 62 and the 
storm drain." He then· told the officers that Connie fell in 
.the water and that he would show them where it happened. 
. The officers took defendant to the storm drain, and he 
$howed them where Connie fell into it. While the officers and 
defendant were at the storm drain, Mr. Marsh, an attorney 
acting apparently'at the request of defendant's family, ar-
rived to representbim.Mr.Marsh conferred privately with 
defendant in the police car and then joined in the search . 
Shortly thereafter the officers learned that Connie's body had 
been found some distance away, and they returned with de-
fendant to the police station. 
About 1 :20 in the afternoon Officer Mabbitt interrogated 
defendant again. Mr. BoUer and a court reporter were also 
present, and the interview was taken down and transcribed. 
Defendant repeated the same story he had told before about 
being with Mr. Mack, drinking beer, picking up .Connie and 
taking her home, and going to the christening. He also stated 
that later in the evening he went to a cafe where Mr. Mack 
worked and to another cafe. He met his mother and father 
and they all drank beer. His father drove him home because 
he was too drunk to drive. The next thing he remembered 
was seeing Connie on the floor of the back seat of his car with 
blood over her. He took her to the storm drain to wash the 
blood off, and she slipped into the water. He looked for ller 
along the bank, and although he could not see her, he could 
hear her moaning and thought she had caught on some roots 
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or something. He then drove home, and the next thing he 
knew the officers awakened him. He stated that he must have 
hit Connie but did not remember. He did not remember using 
any weapon or going to the Mack home that night. He was 
asked whether he had any difficulty with Connie in the past 
and stated that she treated him as if he was dirt. During 
the interview, after answering a question about his wife's car, 
he volunteered that "I have given that statement, and Mr. 
Marsh [the attorney] has told me tIl at he didn't care, just to 
repeat what I'd said here. He said 'You can talk to them if 
you want to, and if you don't, well then--'." 
About 3 :30 in the afternoon, Undersheriff Presley took 
over the questioning of defendant. He told defendant several 
times that he did not believe that defendant did not re-
member further details of the crimes. He testified that ., There 
was considerable discussion back and forth on these points 
and finally he said that he would like to tell his attorney first . 
. . . Q. What did you say to that! A. Well, I tried to im-
press him at this time the importance of telling us at this 
particular time, rather than to wait and tell the attorney 
later .•.. I pointed out to Mr. Modesto in the light of this 
statement regarding the attorney, the fact he could tell his 
attorney what had happened, I felt he did remember and 
he was also capable of telling us at this time." 
The officers then took defendant to dinner and made an 
unsuccessful attempt to reach Mr. Marsh. After dinner 
Undersheriff Presley took defendant back to the office where 
he had been interviewing him and attempted without success 
to call Mr. Marsh on the telephone. He then gave the tele-
phone to defendant, who dialed Mr. Marsh's number but was 
also unable to reach him. Defendant then started to tell the 
officers what had occurred. He made the statements set forth 
above in which he described the details of the commission 
of the crime including the fact that he thought he had had 
intercourse with Connie. 
In Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490-491 [84 S.Ct. 
1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977], the United States Supreme Court 
held that "where ... [a criminal] investigation is no longer 
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to 
focus on It particular suspect, the suspect has been taken 
into police custody, the police carry out a process of interroga-
tions that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, 
the suspect has requested and be<.>n denied an opportunity to 
consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively 
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warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain; 
silent, the accused has been denied t the Assistance of Counsel'· 
in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as 1 
t made obligatory upon the States by the FourtecnthAmend- .1 
ment,' Gideon v. Wainwright, 872 U.S., at 342 [372 U.S. 335 i 
(83 8. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733)], and that 
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation 
may be used against him at a criminal trial." 
With respect to defendant's last and most complete and 
damaging statements, all of the conditions of the Escobedo 
holding were met. It is immaterial that defendant was alIowed 
to consult with his attorney several hours earlier and was 
advised that he could talk to the police if he wished and re-
peat the substantially less damaging admissions he had already 
made at that time. Escobedo had also discussed with his at-
torney what he should do incase of interrogation, but in this 
case as in the Escobedo case, there is no evidence that defend-
ant was advised as to what he should or could do in the face 
of the continuing interrogation that took place. (Escobedo 
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 485, fn. 5 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 
977].) Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed. 
The admissibility of defendant's other statements will arise 
on retrial. [5] The statements made by defendant before 
Connie's body was discovered are admissible. They were 
freely and voluntarily made at a time when the officers were 
concerned primarily with the possibility of saving Connie's 
life. The paramount interest in saving her life, if possible, 
clearly justified the officers in not impeding their rescue 
efforts by informing defendant of his rights to remain silent 
and to the assistance of counsel. Since these statements were 
yoluntarily made and lawfully obtained, there is no basis 
for their exclusion. (See People v. Roberts, 47 Cal.2d 374, 
379 [303 P.2d 721].) It is true that in Massiah v. United 
States, 377 U.S. 201 [84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246], the 
United States Supreme Court held that incriminating state-
ments surreptitiously obtained from an indicted defendant 
who had been released on bail could not be used against him 
at his trial even though the court assumed the statements 
were lawf\lUy obtained in the course of a continuing police 
investigation of crime. In the Massiah case, however, no com-
pelling emergency was present, and the continuing investiga-
tion of other crimes could reasonably be segregated from the 
proof of the crime for which the defendant had been indicted. 
In the present case the officers' investigatory and rescue 
) 
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operations were necessarily inextricably interwoven until 
Oonnie's body was found, and it would be needlessly restric-
tive to exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the 
rescue operations. Under these circumstances we do not be-
lieve that the Massiak case is controlling. 
[6] The statements made between the time Connie's body 
was found and the time defendant sought to consult again 
with his attorney present still a different problem. Under 
our holding in People v. Dorado, ante, p.S38 [42 Cal. 
Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361],thcse statements are inadmissible 
unless as to them defendant· waived his right to counsel and 
his right to remain silent. In view of his reference to his 
attorney's advice with respect to making these statements, 
it is possible that defendant waived his· rights as to them. 
That reference was ambiguous at best, however, and unless the 
prosecution can present additional evidence of waiver on 
retrial, these statements should be excluded. 
[7a] Both the trial court and the prosecutor, as the Cali-
fornia comment rule1 allows, commented on the failure of 
the defendant to take the stand. Defendant contends that 
these comments infringed his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,2 now guaranteed by tbe Fourteenth Amendment to state 
criminal defendants (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 [84 S.Ct. 
1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653]), by permitting unfavorable references 
from his refusal to testify. We reject this contention. We 
hold tbat the use of the comment in defendant's trial was con-
stitutionally permissible. 
There is no . authoritative holding wbether state comment 
rules violate the privilege against self-incrimination. The 
United States Supreme Court bas heard two cases challenging 
state comment rules, but refused to decide the issue in both 
of them. (Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 2-3, fn. 1 [84 S.Ot. 
1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 6531.) In the first case, Twining v. New 
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90-91 [29 S.Ct. 14,53 L.Ed. 97], the 
court assumed that the comment infringed the federal privi-
lege against self-incrimination but held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not require the states to grant that privilege. 
l"No pers9n shall ••• be C(IDlpeUed, in any criminal ease, to be a wit-
ness against himself .•• but in any criminal ease, whether the defendant 
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any 
evidence or facts in the ease against him may be commented upon by the 
court and by counsel, and may btl considered by the court or the jury." 
(Cal. Const., art. I, 113; sce Pen. Code, 11323.) 
2 "No person ••• shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, ••• " (U.S. Const., Amend. V.) 
" ) 
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The court emphasized that "We have assumed only for 
purpose of discussion that what was .done in the case at 
was an infringement of the privilege against .. 
tion. We do not intend, however, to lend any 
to the truth of that assumption." (211 U.S. 78, 114.) 
Adamson v. Ca],ifornia, 332 U.S. 46, 50 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 
L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223], the court again assumed that 
the comment would violate the privilege "without any in-· 
tention thereby of ruling upon the issue," and followed its 
holding in Twining that the Fifth Amendment was not bind-
ing upon the states.B The state courts have divided on the 
question whether the comment rule violates state constitutienal 
protections of the privilege against self-incrimination. (Com- . 
pare In re Opinion of the Justices, 300 Mass. 620, 625 [15. 
N.E.2d 662] (1 dissent); State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 
188 [266 N.W. 116, 104 A.L.R. 464] (2 dissents) (holding the 
comment unconstitutional) with State v. Baker, 115 Vt. 94, . 
98-111 [53 A.2d 53] (2 dissents) ; State v. Sandova]" 59 N.M .. 
85, 88-90 [279 P.2d 850] (finding the comment constitu-
tional) .) ~ 
[8] The rule against comment in the federal courts does 
not necessitate our holding the California comment rule un-
constitutional. The federal rule is founded not on constitu-
tional command but on statutory interpretation. The con- . 
gressional provision that a defendant's failure to request to 
be a witness in the case "shall not create any presumption 
against him" (18 U.S.C. § 3481) has been interpreted to 
exclude any comment. (W~1son v. United States, 149 U.S. 
60,65 (13 S.Ct. 765, 37 L.Ed. 650] ; Bruno v. United States, 
308 U.S. 287, 292-293 [60 S.Ct. 198, 84 L.Ed. 257] ; Adamson 
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, fn. 6 [67 S.Ot. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 
1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].) [9] Although it is the federal 
privilege that is now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ~ .. 
(Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 [84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 
653]), the state must follow only the constitutional and not 
BMr. Justice Black, in dissent, felt that the court's opinion "strongly 
implies that the Fifth Amendment does not, of itself, bar comment upon 
failure to testify in federal courts .•.• " (332 U.S. 46, 69.) 
~In 1869, in People v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530, before the California 
Constitution wB.( amended to permit comment, this court held that the 
comment made 1n that ease violated the state privilege against se1f-
incrimination. The district attorney had argued that silence was a 
circumstance" tending strongly to prove [defendant's] guilt." (PeopZe 
v. Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 527.) The amendment to the California Constitu-
tion allows a much more limited COmment. (People V • .A.ao17l8oo, 27 
Oal.2d 478,489·490 [165 P.2d 3].) 
') 
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the statutory aspects of the privilege. (Ker v. Califorma, 
374 U.S. 23, 31-34 [83 S.Ct. 1623, 10 L.Ed.2d 726].) De-
fendantcontends that the statement in Johnson v. Umted 
States, 318 U.S. 189, 196 [63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. 704],that 
" 'no inferences whatever can be legitimately drawn' "from 
invoking the privilege, establishes that no comment can con-
stitutionally be made on the accused's failure to testify in 
the federal courts. In that case, however, the trial court had 
assured the defendant that he could refuse to answer certain 
questions while on the stand, and yet allowed adverse com~ 
ment on that refusal. The Supreme Court condemned this 
misleading of the defendant on the consequences of his asser-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed in 
Adamson the court distinguished Johnson on this ground. 
It stated that under the California rule "The choice between 
giving evidence and remaining silent was an open choice. 
There was no such possible misleading of the defendant as 
we condemned in Johnson v. United Slates, 318 U.S. 189, 
195-199 {63 S.Ct. 549, 87 L.Ed. '104]." (Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46,58, fn. 17 [67 S.Ct. 1672,91 L.Ed. 1903, 
171 A.L.R. 1223].) Thus, by expressly refraining from de-
ciding whether comment would be permissible under the Fifth 
Amendment and by distinguishing Johnson on the ground 
that the accused had been inisled, the court in Adamson made 
clear that the broad language in Johnson was dictum. More-
over, defendant's refusal to testify can sometimes be used 
against him in a federal trial. Thus, once the defendant 
has taken the stand, the federal rule allows comment on his 
failure to testify on all aspects of the case. (Caminetti v. 
United States, 242 U.S. 470, 492-495 [37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 
442].) Furthermore, defendant's assertion of the privilege 
in an earlier trial can be used to impeach specific testimony 
when he takes the stand in a later trial (Raffel v. United 
States, 271 U.S. 494, 497-499 [46 S.Ct. 566,70 L.Ed. 1054]), 
unless the silence is not inconsistent with his testimony and 
is used only to impeach his general credibility. (Grunewald v. 
United States, 353 U.S. 391, 418-424 [77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 
931, 62 A.L.R.2d 1344]; see Stewart v. United States, 366 
U.S. 1, 6 [81 S.Ct. 941, 6 L.Ed.2d 84].) 
In determintng the constitutionality of the California com-
ment rule, the narrow scope of the permission to comment is 
crucial. I [10] The comment rule does not relieve the prose-
IAllowing lome types of comment might be a denial of due process. 
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cution of its burden of proving every essential elementofJ 
the crime and. the defen~ant 's guilt beyond a reasonable do~bt.y 
No presumptIon of guilt or of the truth of any fact ansea.\: 
No inference can be drawn if defendant does Dot have the) 
knowledge necessary to explain or deny the evidence against ~l 
him. (People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 489-490 [165 P.2d"~ 
8]; Adamson v. OalifOf"nia, 332 U.S. 46, 55-56 {67 S.Ct. 1672, .• ~ 
91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].) [11] The comment 8erves~ 
merely to advise the jury how to treat the evidence the: 
prosecution has introduced. (People v. Ashley, 42 Ca1.2d 246,',1 
268-269 [267 P.2d 271], cert. den. 348 U.S. 900 [75 s.Ct. 222,1 
99 L.Ed. 707].) "[I]f it appears from the evidence thatJ 
defendant could reasonably be expected to explain or deny J 
evidence presented against him, the jury may consider his :~ 
failure to do 80 as tending to indicate the truth of such ; 
evidence and as indicating that among the inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn therefrom, those unfavorable to the J 
defendant are the more probable." (People v. Adamson,' 
27 Cal.2d 478, 490-491 [165 P.2d 3].) 
[7b] Such carefully circumscribed comment does not con-
:flict with the policies of the federal privilege against self-
incrimination. The United States Supreme Court restated 
those policies in Murphy v. Waferfront Oom., 878 U.S. 52, 55 
[84 S,Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678], on the same day it held the' 
Fifth Amendment binding on the states. It stated that the 
privilege was based on "our unwillingness to subject those 
suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, 
perjury or contempt; our preference for an accusatorial 
rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our 
fear that self-incrimination statements will be elicited by in-
humane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which 
dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the 
government to leave the individual alone until good cause 
is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the govern-
ment in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire 
load,' . . . ; our respect for the inviolability of the human 
personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private 
enclave where he may lead a private life,' . . . ; our distrust 
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the 
pri\rilege, while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty' is often 
a 'protection to the innocent.''' [12] The California com-
I 
testify would eompel an aeeeptance of the truth of the pr08ecution's 
evidence." (..400fMOft v. CtJli!omiQ" 332 U.S. 46, 65 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 91 
L.Ed. 1903,171 A.L.R. 1223].) 
) 
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ment rule does not subject the defendant to the trilemma of 
self-accusation, perjury, or contempt, for he remains free not 
to testify. It does not substitute an inquisitorial system for 
an accusatorial system, for the state must introduce evidence 
of every element of the defendant's guilt before any inferenee 
can be drawn from his silence. (People v. Talle, 111 Cal. 
.App.2d 650, 664, 676 [245 P.2d 633].) It affords no op-
portunity for eliciting statements by inhumane treatment or 
abuses. It does not permit the government to disturb the 
individual without good cause or deprecate the inviolability 
of the human personality and the right of each individual 
" 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life.' ,. 
It does not compel reliance on self-deprecatory statements. 
Thus it does not significantly impair any protection the 
privilege affords the innocent. 
Defendant contends, however, that Malloy v. Hogan, 878 
U.S. 1, 8 [84 8.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 658], establishes that 
the comment rule violates the privilege against self-incrim-
ination. In that case, the petitioner refused to answer any 
questions, relying on his privilege against self-incrimination. 
The state court found, however, that the privilege was not 
properly invoked. Petitioner was therefore committed to 
prison until he was willing to answer the questions. The 
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Four-
teenth Amendment guaranteed petitioner the Fifth Amend-
ment's privilege against self-incrimination and that under 
the applicable federal standard, petitioner properly asserted 
the privilege. In discussing the rule that the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids the state from coercing a confession, the 
court stated that "it follows a fortiori that it also forbids the 
States to resort to imprisonment, as here, to compel him to 
answer questions that might incriminate him. The Fourteenth 
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege 
t.hat t.he Fifth Amendment guarantees against f~deral in-
fringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, 
and to suffer no penalty, as held in Twining, for such silence." 
(378 U.S. I, 8; see Grunewald v. United States, 853 U.S. 391, 
425 [77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931, 62 A.L.R.2d 1844] (dis-
sent) ; Adamson v. California, 832 U.S. 46, 124 [67 8.Ct. 1672, 
91 L.Ed. 1903, lql A.L.R. 1223] (dissent).) 
Defendant contends that the inference permitted by the 
comment rule and comment thereon restricts "the unfettered 
exercise of his own will" and constitutes a "penalty" within 
· .. ) 
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the meaning of the quoted language. In the Malloy ease, 
however, the court refrained from expressing any opinion on 
the constitutionality of the comment rule. We do not believe 
. that the court intended by the quoted language to condemn 
the comment rule by implication. Since the court was dealing 
witl: a case in which the defendant had been held in contempt 
for invoking the privilege, we believe it was referring to 
more direct penalties or interferences with the unfettered 
exer<:ise of the defendant's free will than the drawing of the 
reasonable inferences that may fiow from silence and com~ 
mcnt thereon. In this respect it cannot be overemphasized II 
that whether or not the cOurt or prosecutor comments on the , 
defEndant's failure to testify, the jury will draw adverse • 
inferences therefrom. It will expect the defendant to present ~\ 
all the evidence he can to escape conviction, and it will nat· .. , 
uraUy infer that his failure to explain or deny evidence against 
him when the facts are peculiarly within his knowledge arises 
from his inability to do so. "Such an inference is natural and i 
irresistible. It will be drawn by honest jurymen, and no 
instruction will prevent it; "8 (Parker v. Btate,61 N.J.Law 
308, 314 [39 A. 651], ati'd., 62N.J.Law 801 [45 A. 1092]; 
. see Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 
91 L.Ed 1903, 171 A.L.R.1223] (concurring opinion); 8tate 
v. Grebe, 17 Kan. 458, 459; Btate v.Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 
300-301 [8 Am.Rep. 422].) The Constitution is not at war 
with common sense. (See Mapp v.Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,657 
{81 S. Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 84 A.L.R.2d 933].) It does 
not compel the court to· instruct the jurors to ignore infer-
ences their reason dictates. The prevailing view is that such 
an instruction would be futile and confusing.' (8 Wigmore 
on Evidence (McNaughton Rev. 1961) p. 436.) [18] The 
defendant, then,.is normally faced with the choice of testify-
ing to avoid adverse inferences or of remaining silent and 
suffering their cons('quences. The comments do not magnify 
tiThe eomment merely applies here the established rule on failure t~ 
produee evidenee--' I That evidenee is to be estimated not only by its 
own intrinsie weight, but also aeeording to the evidenee whieh it is in 
the power 01'. one side to produee and of the other to contradict." 
(Code Civ. Proe., § 2061, subd. 6.) 
'One state requires lIuch an instruetion to be Jiven (Ind.Ann.Btat., 
§ 9·1603 (1956» and others requi,re that it be given if requested. (8tate 
v. PalleZich, 150 Wash. 411, 420 [273 P. 182]; 8tate Y. Walker, 94 W.Va. 
691,697·698 [120 S.E. 171].) Two states require the jury not to consider 
the inferenee in making its deeision. (Kan.Gen.Stat., § 62·1420 (1949); 
Oaf/alelt Y. 8tate, 152 Tex.Crim.Rep. 198 [211 S.W.2d 950]. Bee gen· 
erally 8 Wigmore on Evidence (MeNaughton Rev.1t61) pp. 436·437.) 
) 
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these normal negative eonseqUE'nces to the extent that they 
become a "penalty" prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. [14J Although the comments might encourage some 
defendants to testify to avoid the inferences that may reason-
ably be drawn from their failure to do so (People v. Adamson, 
27 Cal.2d 478, 487 [165 P.2d 3]), we are of the opinion that 
this encouragement does not amount to the compUlsion to 
testify condemned by the Fifth Amendment. The comments 
merely guide the jury in doing what it would normally do 
in any case. In some cases, comments might aid the defend-
ant by preventing the jury from giving too much weight to 
Ilis refusal to take the stand. (See Bruce, The Right to Com-
ment on the Failur.e of the Defendant to Testify, 31 Mich. 
L.Rev. 226, 231.) 
Defendant contends that People v.Tyler, 36 Cal. 522, 530, 
and People v. Adamson, 27 Cal.2d 478, 487 [165 P.2d 3J, 
establish that the California comment rule violates the privi-
lege against self-incrimination as defined in the Fifth Amend-
ment. In the Tyler case,however, the court was concerned 
only with the state privilege against self-incrimination, and 
in the Adamson case it held, following Twining v. New Jersey, 
211 U.S. 78 [29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97], that the federal privi-
lege was not binding on the states. Accordingly, any state-
ments or implications in those opinions on the scope of the 
federal privilege were necessarily dicta. Whatever the court 
may have believed at the times it decided those cases, we are 
now for the first time required to face the federal constitu-
tional issue. [15J We are bound by the California Consti-
tution '8 provision for comment unless it clearly violates the 
United States Constitution. Since we do not believe that it 
does so, we are precluded from giving effect to any contrary 
implications in Tyler or Adamson. 
[16J Defendant contends that the reason a defendant re-
fuses to testify is that his prior convictions will be introduced 
in evidence to impeach him (Code Civ. Proc., § 2051) and 
not that he is unable to deny the accusations. It is true that 
the defendant might fear that his prior convictions will preju-
dice ,the jury, and therefore another possible inference can 
be drawn from his refusal to take the stand. The inference 
that the jury is authqrized to draw from the failure to take 
the stand, however, need not be the only plausible one to be 
rational under the due process clause. (People v. Adamson, 
27 Cal.2d 478, 493 [165 P.2d 3).) Moreover, without the 
comment rule, the defendant still faces the dilemma of choos-
) 
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ing to testify and having his prior convictions introduced 
or of remaining silent and not giving this evidence to the 
jury. The defendant must weigh the danger of impeachment 
by the introduction of prior convictions for every witness 
he calls for the defense. "The fact that the witness may also 
be the defendant makes the choice more difficult but a denial 
of due process does not emerge from the circumstances." 
(Adamson v. Oalifornia, 332 U.S. 46, 57-58 [67 S.Ct. 1672, 
91 L.Ed 1903, 171 A.L.R. 1223].) 
[17] The privilege against self-incrimination protects the 
defendant from· assisting the prosecution in building its case 
against him. It cannot protect him from the inferences that 
may reasonably be drawn from his failure to rebut the 
prosecution's case to the best of his apparent ability. For the 
court and counsel studiously to ignore those inferences or 
for the court to instruct that no inference is to be drawn 
from the defendant's failure to testify can only result in 
confusing the jury. [18] The existence of the priVilege is 
a matter of common knowledge, and whatever use the de-
fendant makes of it at his trial is also a fact known to the 
jury. The objective of the court's instructions and counsel's 
arguments is to assist the jury in reaching the correct de-
cision on the basis of all of the evidence before it. The Fifth 
Amendment imposes no pointless taboo on the pursuit of that 
objective. 
[19] Defendant contends finally that the trial court erred 
at the trial on the issue of penalty in admitting into evidence 
inflammatory details' of other crimes committed by him. It 
does not appear, however, that the trial court abused its 
discretion in determining that the probative value of the 
challenged evidence outweighed any probable prejudicial ef-
fect. (See People v. Terry, 61 Ca1.2d 137, 142-145 [37 Cal. 
Rptr. 605,390 P.2d 381].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Dooling, J.,. concurred. 
~ 
PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in the 
judgment of reversal, and. in those portions of the majority 
opinion which are unrelated to the issue raised by the Cali-
fornia comment rule. In that connection tIle majority hold that 
*Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign· 
~ent by the Chairman of the Judicinl Council. 
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section 13 of article I of the state Constitution as amended in 
19341 is not rendered unconstitutional by the decision of MaZloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489,12 L.Ed.2d 653]. I cannot 
agree with this conclusion, and dissent therefrom. In my opin-
ion the prosecutor's arguments and the trial court's charge to 
the jury, aU relating to tIle inferences to be indulged because 
defendant did not take the stand, violated his constitutional 
rights as now guaranteed him by the federal and state Con-
stitutions. 
In my opinion the majority in reaching their conclusion 
not only misinterpret the United States Supreme Court eases, 
and their impact on the California comment rule, but fail 
to consider the real impact of several California cases on the 
subject under discussion. . 
The majority concede that Malloy established the rule that 
the Fourteenth Amendment makes the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination binding on the states, and 
quote the Malloy language to the effect that "The Fourteenth 
Amendment secures against state invasion the same privilege 
that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal in-
fringement-the right of a person to remain silent unless he 
chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, 
and to suffer no penalty ... for such silence" (378 U.S. 1, 8), 
In the face of this concession, however, the majority then 
hold that because of the narrow scope of the permission to 
comment in California-i.e., becanse the penalty for not testi-
fying is not very great--such "comment does not conflict with 
the policies of the federal privilege against self-incrimination. " 
I am unable to read into Malloy any inference that a slight 
penalty is "no penalty" at all. I am unable to subscribe to 
the theory that because the inferences to be drawn and com-
mented upon are circumscribed, they do not affect "the 
unfettered exercise" of defendant's will to remain silent. 
As a matter of fact, there is explicit language to the contrary 
in Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 [63 8.Ct. 549, 87 
L.Ed 704] (cited in the majority opinion). There the high 
court said (at pp. 196-197) that "wllere the claim of privilege 
IThe section contains a guarantee that the accused in a criminal case 
shall not be compelled to be a witness against himself. This is couched 
in the exact language of the Fiftll Amendment to the United States 
Constitution, and obviously has the same meaning and effect. The 1934 
amendment added that "in any criminal case, whether the defendant 
testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any 
evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the 
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is asserted and unqualifiedly granted, the requirements of 
fair trial may preclude any comment. That certainly is true 
where the claim of privilege could not properly be denied. 
The rule which obtains when the accused fails to take the 
stand (Wilson v. United Btates, 149 U.S. 60 [13 8. Ct. 765, 
37 L.Ed. 650]) is then applicable .... 'The claim of privilege 
and its allowance is properly no part of the evidence sub-
mitted to the jury, and no inferences whatever can be legiti-
mately drawn by them from the legal assertion by the witness 
of his constitutional right. The allowance of the privilege 
would be a mockery of justice, if either party is to be affected 
injuriously by it.' " (Italics added.) 
The majority attempt to distinguish Johnson on the ground 
that there the defendant had been misled as to the conse-
quences of his reliance on the privilege. That, of course, does 
not explain the explicit holding above quoted. We as a state 
court, on federal constitutional questions, are bound by the 
unqualified language of the United States Supreme Court 
to the effect that where, as here, the privilege against testi-
fying could not have been denied, fair trial precludes "any 
comment" thereon or the invitation to draw "any" infer-
ence therefrom. 
The majority conclude with the assertion that the comment 
allowed by the California rule does not place before the jury 
anything not already within its general store of knowledge--
that is that the jurors as knowledgeable persons are aware 
that one capable of testifying in rebuttal of incriminating 
evidence will ordinarily do so. Therefore, it is asserted, 
neither harm nor injury can occur by reminding them of 
that fact.2 That is to assert that the 1934 amendment accom-
plished nothing at all. But it accomplished a great deal, 
because, as will be later pointed out, it was necessary to pass 
it to change the then existing California law which prohibited 
any comment at all. 
The majority opinion argues at some length that Malloy 
did not, by implication or otherwise, overrule Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 [67 8. Ct. 1672, 91 L.Ed. 1903, 171 
A.L.R. 12~3], which affirmed this court's holding in People 
v. Adamson, 27 Ca1.2d 478 [165 P.2d 3], on the theory that 
2This reasoning might suppoJlt a holding that the error was not preju-
dicial, or a charge or comment to the effect that the jury may draw the 
usual inferences from the failure of the ilefense, as distinct from the de-
fendant personally, to offer evidence in rebuttal of incriminating testi-
mony. Such instruction or comment would serve all the purposes advo-
('.atcd in the majority opinion without raising the constitutional issue. 
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under then existing law tile Fifth Amendment, not then being 
binding on the states, did not prohibit the comment permitted 
by the 1934 amendment. . 
The majority opinion concedes that MaUoy overruled Adam-
son insofar as it held that the Fifth Amendment was not 
binding on the states. It is now the law, since Malloy, that 
the states are bound, via the Fourteenth Amendment, by the 
provisions of the Fifth Amendment. When Adamson was de-
cided by tIle Supreme Court this was not the law. Thus 
Adamson could not, and did not, discuss the question with 
which we are concerned. Adamson did not hold the Cali-
fornia comment rule was consistent with the provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment, but held simply that the validity of the 
rule was not to be tested by the provisions of that amendment. 
Thus, it is obvious that the portions of Adamson not overruled 
by Malloy are not and cannot be determinative of the issue 
before us now. What is now left of Adamson is merely the 
holding that this court did not err in holding that the Cali-
fornia comment rule did not violate the California Constitu-
tion. But that is not the problem here involved. The question 
now before us, not decided in Adamson, is whether our state 
constitutional provision may stand in view of the federal man-
date. To determine that question we need only refer to the 
unchallenged rule in California prior to the adoption of the 
1934 amendment. 
As already pointed out, long before 1934 the California 
Constitution provided, and now provides, in the identical 
language of the Fifth Amendment, that no defendant in a 
criminal case shall be compelled to be a witness against him-
self (see fn. 1). Before the 1934 amendment to that section, 
in a long line of cases, this court interpreted the state-con-
ferred constitutional immunity (which is identical to the 
Fifth Amendment) to prohibit any comment whatever on the 
dt>fendant's failure to take the stand. This long line of cases 
is in fact being overruled by the majority opinion. 
The first case to interpret the original constitutional pro-
vision similar to the Fifth Amendment was People v. Tyler, 
36 Cal. 622, 530. Prior to Tyler, a defendant in a criminal 
action was incompetent as a witness. California then adopted 
a statute (now Pen. Code, § 1323.5) making a defendant 
compl'tent at his own request. In Tyler, the prosecution suc-
cessful1y claimed in the trial court that failure to take the 
stand and deny testimony presumably within his knowledge 
gave rise to inferences adverse to the defendant. This court 
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revel'8ed and held that the policy of t11e recently adopted 'I 
statute making defendant, at his request, competent was:. 
simply to allow the defendant to rebut evidence against him .1 
if he so desired, but not to compel him to take the stand, or to 
suffer adverse inferences. It was further held that any suchl 
policy would be violative of the privilege against self-incrimi. 
nation contained in the California Constitution if his failure 
to testify were used to support" an inference unfavorable to 
him" (36 Cal. at p. 528). 
Thereafter, Tyler was followed without exception until, 
65 years later, in 1934, the California Constitution was 
amended to authorize comment on defendant's failure to 
testify. These cases establish without question that under 
the old law (now binding on California via the Fifth Amend-
ment) defendant's failure to testify could not be used in 
any manner to prejudice him.8 
People v. Albertson, supra, 23 Cal.2d 550, referred to in 
the footnote, is of particular interest because there Chief 
Justice Traynor (then Justice Traynor) in his concurring 
opinion said (at p. 584): "Before the constitutional amend-
ment it was error to comment on the defendant's failure 
to take the stand or to advise the jury that it could draw 
inferences unfavorable to him on that account. (People v. 
Tyler, 36 Cal. 522.) The constitutional amendment changes 
the rule of the Tyler case and permits such comment but does 
not do more." He then went on to hold that the comment of 
the prosecutor in Albertson went beyond that allowable under 
the constitutional amendment. 
Under these cases, it is perfectly clear that prior to the 
1934 amendment the then existing constitutional privilege 
against self-incrimination prohibited any comment about de-
8A partial list of these eases follows: People v. McGungul, 41 Cal. 
429, 431; People v. Brown, 53 Cal. 66, 67; People v. Baniler8, 114 Cal. 
216 [46 P. 153] (citing McGungill, rather than Tyler); People v. Kromp-
hold, 172 Cal. 512, 523 [157 P. 599] (affirming the rule, but holding the 
error to have been cured, and hence not prejudicial); People v. Mayefl., 
188 Cal. 237,259 [205 P. 435, 24 A.L.R. 1383] (also affirming judgment 
because of lack of prejudice); Fros8 v. Wotton, 3 Cal.2d 384, 393 (44 
P.2d 350] (civil case applying the Tyler rule to a comparable situation, 
and including a history of the privilege indicating the necessity of dis-
allowing comment); People v. Albertson, 23 Ca1.2d 550, 584 [145 P.2d 7] 
(concurring .pinion by Traynor, J., adding the comment as an additional 
ground for reversal) ; People v. MorriB, 3 Cal.App. 1, 6 [84 P. 463] (hold-
ing comment to be prejudicial per se, even when instruction to disregard 
it was given after objection); l'eople v. Ke'ko, 27 Cal.App. 351, 353 
[149 P. 1003] (citing Morris only); People v. Wademan, 38 Cal.App_ 
116,133 [175 P. 791] (acknowledging rule, but distinguishing the case on 
th~ faets); and People v. Brown, 81 Cal.App. 226, 242 [253 P. 735]. 
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fendant's failure to take the stand. No inference of any kind 
unfavorable to him could be predicated on such failure. Now, 
since MaUoy, the state is bound by the provisions of the Fifth 
Amendment which is framed in language identical to that used 
in the California Constitution prior to its amendment. A 
fortiori, therefore, the present ruJe in California is now the 
same as the rule that existed in California before 1934. It 
is that rule that the majority opinion so cavalierly disregards 
and necessarily overrules.· 
Some reference should be made to this court's decision in 
People v. Adamson, supra, 27 Cal.2d 478, written by Justice 
Traynor, which upheld the constitutionality of the 1934 
amendment under the California Constitution. In that case 
this court did not then hold, as it attempts to do today, that 
there was no conflict between the privilege against self-in-
crimination and the right to comment on the exercise of that 
privilege. Quite to the contrary it carefully and correctly 
held that such a conflict existed but that the state, by the 
1934 amendment, had qualified that right. At page 487 this 
court then stated : "The practical effect of the 1934 amend-
ment may be that many defendants who otherwise would not 
take the stand will feel compelled to do so to avoid the ad-
verse effects of the comments and consideration authorized 
by the amendment .... Such a coercive effect, however, is 
sanctioned by the amendment, which, being later in time, 
controls provisions adopted earlier." It will be noted that 
there this court characterized the comment rule as constituting 
a "compelling" waiver of the privilege and as having a 
"coercive effect" upon a defendant who desired to avail him-
self of the privilege. Today the court characterizes the com-
ment rule as imposing but an inconsequential penalty. 
From the foregoing it follows that, unless the majority are 
willing to overrule People v. Tyler, supra, 36 Cal. 522, and 
the many cases following it, and People v. Adamson, supra, 
27 Ca1.2d 478, there is no alternative but to hold that the 
California comment rule creates. a compulsion upon a de-
fendant "who otherwise would not take the stand" and has a 
"coercive effect." The contrary rule adopted by the majority 
does not permit a defendant "to remain silent unless he 
4It should also be mentioned thnt New Jersey (a state which bad 
n eomment rule compnrable to t~at permitted by the 1934 amerdment 
to our Constitution) bas held that in light of Mallo" the old New Jersey 
rllll' \'job!!'s the privileges grantN} uy the Fiftll Amendment (Stale v. 
Murphy (1964) 85 N.J. Super. 391 [204 A.2d 888]). 
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chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will." 
Malloy informs us that such a defendant is "to suffer no 
penalty . . . for such silence." The majority rule authorizes 
the court and prosecutor to invite the jury to indulge in those 
inferences which Johnson holds would constitute a "mockery 
of justice." Thus, in my opinion, the comment rule is un-
constitutional. That being so it was error to permit such com-
ment. 
Were it not for the other errors pointed out in the majority 
opinion which require a reversal, the error under discussion, 
however, might not necessarily require a reversal. In my 
opinion the beneficent provisions of section 4% of article VI 
of our state Constitution are applicable to such error. 
It is urged that that section is not applicable to errors 
involving due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
this connection reliance is had upon some very strong lan-
guage to that effect in such cases as People v. Kiihoa, 53 Cal. 
2d 748, 752 [3 Cal.Rptr. 1, 349 P.2d 673] ; People v. Modesto, 
59 Cal.2d 722 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33] ; People v. Muza, 
178 Cal.App.2d 901 [3 Cal.Rptr. 395] ; and in Witkin, Cali-
fornia Criminal Procedure (1963) 733-734. Comfort is also 
found in the language of sueh federal decisions as Rogers v. 
Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 [81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760] ; Jack-
son v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908], 
and similar cases dealing with the admission of involuntary 
confessions. The language of these and other authorities, 
when separated from the problem there under discussion, 
appears to support the proposition that whenever the error 
is predicated upon constitutional grounds and results in the 
denial of a fair trial (due process under the Fourteenth 
Amendment) it is reversible per se, and the resulting judg-
ment is not saved by the fact that the error was not prej-
udicial. However, when such authorities are viewed together 
with those which have failed to reverse in the presence of 
acknowledged constitutional error, it becomes apparent that 
those requiring reversal per Be comprise a specific class, deal-
ing with the admission of coerced confessions or evidence 
obtained by brutality or other conduct shocking to the sensi-
bilities. Other authorities (both federal and state) indicate 
that in many other situations the courts have held error 
which cOl'lstituted a denial of due process to have been non-
prejudicial and hence nonreversible. 
Looking first to the federal rule, the authorities relied upon 
dealt either with the use of a coerced confession or evidence 
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obtained by similar coercion, force or brutality. They are 
the eases that adopted the so-called "exclusionary rule." 
That rule requires the absolute exclusion of evidence obtained 
in the manner indicated, as well as all evidence which is the 
product thereof ("fruit of the poisoned tree"), and likewise 
requires reversal if such confession or evidence has not been 
excluded. On the other hand, Malloy (which is the cause of 
our present reexamination of the rule) gives no hint that the 
highest federal court considers every violation of due process 
to be prejudicial per se. Many prior decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court indicate that it will not reverse for 
every acknowledged constitutional error, some of which dealt 
with error of the type alleged herein. In Snyder v. Massa-
chusetts, 291 U.S. 97 [54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674, 90 A.L.R. 
575], it was held that the absence of defendant during the 
proceedings against him would constitute a denial of due 
process. However, the court refused to reverse because the 
defendant was absent from such a minor portion of the pro-
ceeding that no prejudice resulted. Justice Cardozo, speaking 
for the court, said (at pp. 106-108): "Nowhere in the de-
cisions of this court is there a dictum, and still less a ruling, 
that the Fourteenth Amendment assures the privilege of 
presence when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a 
shadow .... So far as the Fourteenth Amendment is con-
cerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due 
process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be 
thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." It ap-
pears that in Snyder the high court applied to acknowledged 
constitutional error the same test required by our state con-
stitutional provision prohibiting reversal in the absence of a 
miscarriage of justice. 
In J ohmon v. United States, supra, 318 U.S. 189, the court 
held that comment on the defendant's reliance on his privi-
lege against self-incrimination was error, but failed to reverse 
because the error had been waived. That was not tantamount 
to affirmance because the error.was nonprejudicial, but in-
dicates that denial of due process is not always reversible 
per se. 
In Wilson \". United States, 149 U.S. 60 [13 S.Ct. 765, 37 
L.Ed. 650], the court reversed because of the prosecutor's 
comment on defendant's failure to take the stand as a witness. 
There the court held the comment to be error because of a 
federal statute requiring that no presumption shall be created 
against defendant by reason of his decision not to testify, and 
) 
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therefore was not required to rely on the constitutional prO::·, 
visions. However, the following language (at p. 70) is per:-'.:i .. '·'
suasive herein: "'We do not see how this statute can bef 
completely enforced, unless it be adopted as a rule of practice .. -4 
that such improper and forbidden reference by counsel for'~~ 
the prosecution shall be regarded good ground for a new trial.: 
in aU cases where the proofs of guilt are not so clear and;~ 
conclusive that the court can say affirmatively the accused "i 
couzil not have been harmed from that cause.''' (Italics t 
added.) While the closing clauses of the foregoing quota-! 
tion may be less liberal than our Watson rule (People v. 
Watson, 46 Ca1.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]), it conclusively 
demonstrates that, in the field of illegal comment, the United 
States Supreme Court has in the past been mindful of the fact 
that error may be nonreversible when the circumstances show 
it to be nonprejudicial. For similar reasoning by the lower 
federal courts, see Coleman v. Denno (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1963) 
223 F.Supp. 938, affirmed in United States v. Denno (2d 
Cir. 1964) 330 F.2d 441; United States v. Di Carlo (2d Cir. 
1933) 64 F.2d 15. 
Turning now to the California authorities, even more cause 
exists to adhere to the dictates of section 4% of article VI of 
our state Constitution. Prior to the 1934 amendment author- . 
izing comment on a defendant's failure to testify as a wit- . 
ness, as already pointed out, such comment was violative of 
the defendant's constitutional privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. But, during that period, it was the uniform rule that 
such comment, although erroneous, did not require reversal 
if, under the circumstances of the case, it was not prejudicial 
(People v. Mayen, supra, 188 Cal. 237, 259.)S A similar, 
although not identical issue was presented in People v. 
O'Bryan, 165 Cal. 55 [130 P. 1042], wherein the court held 
that defendant's previous testimony before the grand jury 
had not been voluntary, and for that reason it was error to 
allow evidence of that previous testimony to be produced at 
trial. However, conviction was affirmed on the ground that 
the error was not prejudicial. 
Subsequent to the 1934 amendment authorizing comment 
on the defendant's failure to t.estify there was no cause for 
the courts ttl pass upon the prejudicial or nonprejudicial 
SCertain language contained in the Mayen opinion, going to an entirel;r 
different point, has reeentl;r been 'disapproved in People v. Mattutm, 
61 Cal.2d 466, 470 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 393 P.2d 161). Such disapproval does 
. not affect the matters here involved. 
) 
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nature of a procedure which was no longer erroneous. How-
ever, the introduction of, or comment upon, defendant's pre-
vious testimony before the grand jury was presented on several 
occasions. In Peop1,e v. Kynette, 15 Ca1.2d 731, 749-751 [104 
P.2d 794], it had been held that a defendant who had volun-
tarily testified before the grand jury as to some matters, 
but who had refused to answer other questions on the ground 
of self-incrimination, and who voluntarily testified at his 
trial, migllt be impeached by cross-examination as to the in-
consistency between his exculpatory testimony at trial and 
his alleged basis for claiming privilege before the grand jury.6 
The opinion pointed out the limited purpose for which such 
evidence might be introduced. Shortly thereafter, a similar 
problem was presented in People v. Montgomery, 47 Cal. 
App.2d 1 [117 P.2d 437]. There the court was bound by 
Kynette to hold the introduction of the matters which tran-
spired before the grand jury to have been admissible for the 
limited purpose of impeachment. However, the court found 
error in the fact that the prosecutor was allowed to comment 
on the evidence for the purpose of drawing the inferences 
beyond that specific limitation. That error, however, was held 
to have been nonprejudicial, the court stating (at p. 21) that 
"it does not follow that every' invasion of even a constitu-
tional right necessarily requires a reversal, ... " (Citing 
Peop1,e v. O'Bryan, supra, 165 Cal. 55, 60.) 
Erroneous denials of constitutional guarantees other than 
those arising out of the Fifth Amendment (but many which 
were held to have constituted a denial of due process) have 
consistently been held not to require reversal when not prej-
udicial. A few examples are set forth: 
(a) Error arising out of the absence of defendant from a 
portion of the proceedings-People v. Isby, 30 Ca1.2d 879, 
894 [186 P.2d 405]; Peop1,e v. Daniels, 85 Ca1.App.2d 182, 
195 [192 P.2d 788] ; People v. Miller, 33 Cal. 99; Peop1,e v. 
Erwin,4 Cal.App. 394,396 [88 P. 371]. (The last two were 
decided prior to the adoption of section 4% of article VI.) 
(b) Failure to instruct defendant as to certain of his rights 
-People v. 'O'Brien, 88 Cal. 483, 489-490 [26 P. 362]. 
(c) Illegal search and seizure-People v. Parham, 60 Cal. 
2d 378 [33 Ca1.Rptr. 497, 384 P.2d 1001], wherein it is said 
(at p. 386) : "To require automatic reversal for such harm-
less error could not help but generate pres.'3ure to find that 
6This holding of Kynette may now be open to question in view of 
Malloy. 
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the unreasonable police conduct was lawful after all and 
thereby to undermine constitutional standards of police con-
duct to avoid needless retrial. ... An exclusionary rule so 
rigidly administered could thereby defeat itself." 
If the word "prosecution" is substituted for the word 
"police" where the latter twice appears in the quotation 
from Parham, the reasoning applies equally to improper com-
ment on defendant's failure to take the stand. 
In this opinion there is no necessity to determine whether 
the claimed error was prejudicial, first because the majority 
has ruled that it was not error, and second because the judg-
ment must be reversed for reasons other than the violation of 
the comment rule. 
I agree with everything said in the majority opinion, in-
cluding the reversal, except that portion discussing the com-
ment rule. From that portion of the opinion, I dissent. 
SCHAUER, J.,. Concurring and Dissenting.-I concur in 
those portions of the majority opinion which resolve the issue 
grounded on the California comment rule (Cal. Const., art I, 
§ 13). Specifically, I agree with the discussion and conclusions 
of the Chief Justice relative to the applicability and effect of 
Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [84 S.Ct. 1489,12 L.Ed.2d 
653], and upholding the good sense and constitutional vitality 
of the subject rule. 
To suggest that reasonable inferences will not or should 
not be drawn by the fact finder from the failure of an accused 
to testify as to matters obviously within his knowledge is 
absurd. Common sense tells us that in such a situation the 
inferences will be adverse to the defendant if no comment-
i.e., no instruction-is given relative to the right of an accused 
to stand on his plea of not guilty and the comprehensive 
burden of the state to prove every element of guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The California comment rule operates 
constructively to make real and workable to a conscientious 
fact finder the right of the accused and the burden of the 
prosecution. 
The'use of the comment rule in defendant's trial was not 
only constitutionally permissible, it was good sense and 
eminently fair. When there is neither relevant court instruc-
tion nor any reference by court or counsel to defendant's 
silence in the face of obvious and significant evidence of guilt, 
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assign-
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council. 
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the impact of the silence on the jury will more likely intensify 
than diminish the force of the positive evidence. ConS'cien-
tious and intelligent jurors are curious jurors; they yearn for 
full instructions covering their duty in resolving every issue 
before them. 
The subject California rule is not so much a comment rule 
as it is an instruction as to law and a caution as to duty: it 
emphasizes the burden of the prosecution to prove beyond 
reasonable doubt every essential element of the crime charged; 
it makes altogether clear. the right of the defendant not to 
testify at an and not to be prejudiced by his o'wn mere silence; 
it precludes the jury from drawing any inference adverse to 
the defendant because of his decision not to testify unless it is 
further shown that defendant has knowledge of, and the 
ability to produce, facts which could deny or explain, or in 
some way obviate the effect of, evidence which if believed, 
would establish guilt. The rule is essentially correlative both 
to defendant's fundamental right of silence and to the state's 
burden of proof; it becomes operative only when competent 
evidence has been adduced which is sufficient to establish 
(1) a prima facie case against the accused, and (2) his ability 
to furnish exculpatory evidence. Then the necessity for, and 
the fairness of, the rule become obvious. The comment itself 
must be hypothetically definitive and explanatory of the rule 
and its application. Certainly as held by the majority such 
.. carefully circumscribed comment does not con1lict with the 
policies of the federal privilege against self-incrimination." 
Failure to comment at all on the obvious facts, or on the 
other extreme, categorically directing the jurors not to draw 
inferences which the undisputed evidence and a sound mind 
dictate, would be futile and would tend to make a mockery 
of the fact finding process. 
Weare bound to recognize that the essential function of 
jurors is to draw (or resolve conflicting) inferences from all 
material circumstances. The failure of a defendant to testify 
relative to tentatively established incriminating facts which 
are peculiarly within his knO\vledge is in itself a fact whic)], 
as hereinabove suggested, may become the more portentous if 
comment thereon, as required and limited by the California 
rule, is precluded. As the Chief Justice says, "The defendant 
. . . is normally faced 'With the choice of testifying to avoid 
adverse inferences or of remaining silent and suffering their 
consequences. " The purpose of a fair trial is to discover 
t.he truth and upon the truth to render the judgment provided 
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by law. A fair trial cannot be had in an intellectual vacuum; 
and a fair trial-of course, but it bears emphasis-must be 
equally concerned with fairness to the whole body politic as 
well as to the defendant. 
I do not concur in the conclusional declaration that "With 
respect to defendant's last and most complete and damaging 
statements, all of the conditions of the Escobedo holding were 
met .... Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed." I am 
not persuaded that the hypothesis is tenable or that this result 
must follow. What may be "most ... damaging statements" 
is typically for jury and trial judge appraisal. And as I read , 
the Escobedo opinion I am impressed with the conclusion that 
Mr. Justice Goldberg diligently sought to confine its appli-
cation to the case he defined and decided. I would limit its 
reach by the aggregate-not by a selected item or items-of 
the congeries of facts which he so painstakingiy assembled 
and by multiple reiterations emphasizes. As demonstrated 
to my satisfaction by Justice Burke in his dissenting opinion 
in People v. Dorado (1965) ante, pp. 338, 364 [41 Cal. 
Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361], the recited facts of that case 
clearly show that the majority ruling therein was not com-
pelled by Escobedo. To the contrary, as hereinafter docu-
mented, Dorado appears to me to extend the scope of Escobedo 
in an area forbidden to us by the California Constitution. 
I agree with Chief Justice Traynor that Massiah v. United. 
States (1964) 377 U.S. 201 [84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246], 
is not controlling here, but I note also a related statement 
which on its face might appear to be a speculative or ad-
visory ruling relative to a question of law and fact which 
mayor may not arise on the third trial of the case at bench. 
The proposition is stated by the majority as follows: "The 
statements made between the time Connie's body was found 
and the time defendant sought to consult again with his 
attorney present still a different problem. Under our holding 
in People v. Dorado, ante, p. 338 [42 Cal.Rptr. 169, 
398 P.2d 361], these statements are inadmissible unless 8S 
to them defendant waived his right to counsel and his right 
to remain silent. In view of his reference to his attorney's 
advice with respect to making these statements, it is possible 
that defendant waived his rights as to them. That reference 
was ambiguous at best, however, and unless the prosecution 
can preseflt additional evidence of waiver on retrial, these 
statements should be excluded." The metage of inferences 
which may be drawn from the myriad cumulant circum-
stallces of a trial is both primarily and distinctively a trial 
) 
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judge's function. It is only upon the complete absence of 
tenable inferences supportive of the trial court's mling that 
we should disturb a judgment in this respect. I do not find 
myself sufficiently qualified by the record of the second trial 
now before us to rule for the next trial that "unless the 
prosecution can prcsent additional evidence of waiver . . . 
the statements should be excluded." In the ease at bench I 
find no error in their admission. 
I agree with Chief Justice Traynor that on any tenable 
view of the law .. The statements made by defendant before 
Connie's body was discovered are admissible" and that 
"there is no basis for their exclusion." These statements 
alone (i.e., excluding from consideration all other statements 
by defendant), when considered with the other probative 
evidence which was properly received, in my view amply sup-
port the judgment of the trial court. I also agree that "In 
the present case the officers' investigatory and rescue opera-
tions were necessarily inextricably interwoven until Connie's 
body was found, and it would be needlessly restrictive to 
exclude any evidence lawfully obtained during the rescue 
operations. Under these circumstances we do not believe that 
the Massiah case is controlling." 
Although, as above shown, I am in full accord with much 
of the discussion by the Chief Justice, and with a number 
of his important conclusions, I cannot agree that the judg-
ment must or should be again reversed. It becomes necessary 
to again refer to what I understand to be the duty unequivo-
cally imposed upon this court by the Constitution of Cali-
fornia which grants-and specificaUy limits-our jurisdiction 
in the review of "criminal cases where judgment of death 
has been rendered." I have reference to sections 41 and 4%,2 
article VI. I know of no power possessed by this court other 
than such as is granted to it by the people of the state in the 
Constitution of California. (Manifestly the grant of state 
power does not come from the United States Constitution or 
1California Constitution, article VI, aeetion 4: "The Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction . • . on questions of Jaw GZone, in all 
criminal cases where judgment of death has been rendered; ••• " (Italics 
added.) , 
2California Constitution, article VI, section 4*: "No judgment shall 
be set asidt', or new trial grant.ed, in any ease, on the ground of mis· 
direction of the jury, or of .the improper admission or rejection of evi-
dence, or for any error as to any matter of pleading, or for an,. error 
as to any matter of prot'edure, unless, after an examination of the entire 
cause, including the evidenee, the court shall be of the opinion that the 
error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice. II 
/) 
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the judgment of a federal court.) That same grantor, in the 
same document, also expressly delimits our power in tbe 
specific area which is relevant. That limitation, it appears to 
me, is transgressed by the recent majority decision in People 
v. Dorado (1965) supra, ante, p. 338, as is indicated by the 
dissents of both Mr. Justice McComb and Mr. Justice Burke. 
I have no quarrel with the forthright narration of facts 
in the majority opinion of tbe case at bench. Among other 
things the majority candidly state "It is not disputed that 
defendant killed the two girls." I add that on any reason-
able view of the evidence it is not disputable that tbe evi-
dence sustains the jury's implied findings at both the first 
trial and at the second trial that the object of the two 
murders was to accomplish the rape of Connie. I cannot find 
anything in this record which justifies the conclusion of fact 
or of law that either the conviction· of defendant or the 
sentence of death pronounced thereon constitutes a mis-
carriage of justice. 
Indubitably it is our duty to be concerned with the phi-
losophy as well as the letter of criminal law. Of course 
our system is not a perfect one. It is not yet given to human 
beings to create a society perfectly motivated or governed. 
Men of goodwill may differ sharply in selecting the means 
to an end, if not as to the objective itself. The ever increasing 
number in recent years of reversals on technical grounds of 
judgments in major criminal cases suggests the need for 
reexamination of the incidents of our philosophy and of our 
procedures. Are we to abandon or continue to recognize the 
theory that as between mankind and the lower animals there 
is a major difference in social responsibility T Are we to 
continue or abandon the theory that human beings are free 
moral agents' That those who fail to be restrained by moral 
concepts may nevertheless be deterred away from, or influ-
enced toward, a given course of conduct by punishment on 
the one hand or reward on the other T In our organized society 
today, should the courts, as perhaps the chief instrumentality 
for attaining its elementary objectives, be primarily con-
cerned with protecting the crime perpetrating nonconformist, 
not merely in the heretofore recognized constitutional rights 
of law abiding members, but, as against execution of penal 
sanctions ior demonstrated guilt, in revising procedural rules 
and applying the revisions retroactively for tIle benefit of 
the accused' Or should we, give our first concern to protect-
ing law abiding members of that society by firm and prompt 
enforcement of tenable rules of law as against the rapist-
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murderers and similar types of criminal nonconformists T 
Certainly even the most evil one shall have his due process 
and fair trial. This defendant has enjoyed these benefits 
twice over. The sledge hammer slayings of Connie Mack and 
Mary Mack cannot be undone. But sure, prompt and un-
relenting exaction of the penalty of the law could serve to 
save other innocents from similar deaths. If this philosophy 
is wrong then it would seem that our entire penal-sanction-
for-crime system of law should be abandoned. But until a 
better system has been provided let us not destroy or further 
deplete the efficacy of the one we have. 
For the reasons sufficiently articulated in my dissent in 
People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 735 [31 Cal.Rptr. 
225, 382 P.2d 33], I could not then concur in reversing the 
judgment on the prior appeal. The reversing justices made 
no finding that it was more probable than not that a verdict 
more favorable to the defendant would have resulted in the 
absence of the then declared error. The reversal therefore, 
as I understand the language of, and respect due, our Con-
stitution, was, and today's is, in excess of this court's appel-
late jurisdiction as exclusively granted and specifically limited 
by sections 4 and 4%, article VI, California Constitution 
(see fns. 1 and 2, ante, p. 467). 
I think it is fair also to add that the reversals of the judg-
ments, both on this appeal and the preceding one, appear to 
be due not to any incompetence or neglect or mistakes of the 
investigating or prosecuting officers, or of the trial judges. 
The reversals have come because courts of appellate jurisdic-
tion have seen fit, or felt compelled, to change the rules 
goverr..ing relevant procedures and to make the changes retro-
actively effective. If the compulsion for retroactive applica-
tion is not absolute it should not be indulged. The people of 
California, as well as this defendant, have a right to due 
process and fair law enforcement. Among the people who 
are punished most severely by the new trials are, of course, 
the family members of the murdered little girls. 
It appears to me that the proceedings on, and the result., of, 
the second trial, as illumined also by the record of the first 
trial, demonstrate that there has been no miscarriage of 
justice in the ttial court. 
For all the reasons llereinabove stated I would affirm the 
jUdgment. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
